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China Property Slump Stresses Banks as NPLs Rise and Recoveries Lag

• Listed banks’ corporate-property nonperforming loan ratio rose 0.23 percentage points to 3.65 percent in 2025, EY said, showing growing developer-loan stress. • Everbright Bank’s property-sector nonperforming loan ratio jumped to 7.17 percent by June 2026, with bad loans reaching 10.7 billion yuan. • Overall commercial bank nonperforming loans stayed near 1.52 percent, but rural banks struggle to sell foreclosed homes, delaying recoveries and deepening risk. • Mortgage stress widened at most listed banks, while regulators’ support for Vanke and weak auction demand complicate estimates of true banking losses.

China’s property downturn has inflicted meaningful damage on parts of the banking system, especially lenders exposed to developers, even as headline asset-quality indicators remain broadly stable. Ernst & Young’s May 2026 review found that listed banks’ corporate-property nonperforming loan ratio rose 0.23 percentage points to 3.65 percent in 2025. More granular disclosures show sharper deterioration at some institutions: China Everbright Bank’s property-sector nonperforming loan ratio climbed from 4.94 percent at end-2025 to 7.17 percent by June 2026, with bad loans reaching 10.7 billion yuan, nearly a fifth of its total. Yet the National Financial Regulatory Administration reported overall commercial bank nonperforming loans at 1.52 percent at end-June 2026, only 0.01 percentage points higher than in March. The severity of the problem is harder to gauge because reported nonperforming loans depend on classification choices and on how much banks can recover. Reuters reported in January that rural banks were struggling to sell hundreds of foreclosed properties despite steep discounts, leaving unpaid loans on balance sheets. Across China’s court-auction market, only 24.1 percent of properties offered in auctions ending in January-September 2026 were sold, up from 22.3 percent a year earlier, according to China Index Academy. Banks can also write off losses or sell debts to investors, but neither method proves that borrowers have repaid. Regulators have at times influenced recognition of distress: Reuters reported that lenders were given informal “window guidance” to support China Vanke and avoid actions that would worsen its cash squeeze, including holding off on interest collection, even though some loans were already overdue. Trends are uneven across lenders. Bank of China’s mainland corporate-property nonperforming loan ratio fell from 6.26 percent at end-2025 to 6.1 percent in June 2026, contrasting with Everbright’s rise. Mortgage stress, however, has become more common. A September review of 19 large and medium-sized listed banks found that 10 of 14 disclosing mortgage nonperforming loan ratios reported increases between end-2025 and June 2026, while three declined and one was unchanged. At China Construction Bank, nonperforming domestic residential mortgages rose from 53.27 billion yuan to 57.56 billion yuan, and the ratio increased from 0.89 percent to 0.98 percent, even as outstanding mortgage lending declined. These figures show repayment pressure spreading beyond developers to homebuyers, though they do not isolate how much deterioration is directly attributable to the property slump. Authorities are trying to reshape financing to reduce future losses and sustain project delivery. The World Bank said China’s white-list initiative, led by ministries including the National Financial Regulatory Administration, matches financially viable projects with bank financing and supported delivery of about 7.5 million homes by end-2025. New rules issued by the People’s Bank of China and the regulator on August 28 require a lead bank for each development project, segregated project funds and staged loan releases as construction progresses. Older contracts remain under existing terms. Fitch Ratings said the framework should improve funding discipline but is unlikely to lift weak housing demand, while the IMF warned that broad financing support and forbearance could prolong adjustment by keeping nonviable developers alive. For banks, the ultimate cost will depend on borrowers’ repayments and the value recovered from distressed property sales.